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Hal	 Schef*ler,	 in	 arguing	 that	 native	 concepts	 about	 procreation	 provide	 the	 basis	 for	 kin	reckoning	universally,	presented	considerable	evidence	for	his	argument,	in	addition	to	the	extension	rules	for	which	he	is	best	known,	This	essay	applies	this	evidence	to	the	Navajo	materials	and	shows	that	a	Schef*lerian	analysis	is	correct.	By	contrast,	the	analysis	of	Nava-jo	kinship	by	Gary	Witherspoon,	indebted	to	David	Schneider’s	ideas,	is	shown	to	be	wide	of	the	mark.	 Schef*ler	 also	 argued,	 in	much	 the	 same	 logical	 vein,	 that	 gender	 classi*ication	around	the	world	is	bipartite,	that	claims	of	a	“third	sex”	are	without	merit.	The	argument	is	applied	to	“third	sex”	claims	by	Wesley	Thomas,	which	claims	are	shown	to	be	baseless.	
Keywords:	Navajo,	 kinship	 theory,	 gender	 classi*ication,	 semantic	 analysis,	 scholarly	 re-sponsibility	
1.0	Introduction	The	Navajo	are	easily	the	most	ethnographically	studied	people	in	the	world. 	Their	ideas	1about	kinship	were	 relatively	well	 known	 (see	 references)	even	before	 the	publication	of	Gary	Witherspoon’s	 (1975)	Navajo	 Kinship	 and	Marriage	 and	 his	 other	 publications	 (see	below).Witherspoon’s	analysis	rejects	the	idea	that	Navajo	kinship	is	grounded	in	the	pro-creative	relations	within	the	nuclear	family.	As	such	it	is	self-consciously	indebted	to	David	Schneider’s	writings.	Here	it	needs	to	be	recalled	that	these	writings,	especially	A	Critique	of	
the	Study	of	Kinship	(Schneider	1984),	alleged	that	Western	ethnographers	applied	to	non-Western	forms	of	kin-reckoning	 ideas	based	only	on	their	own	ethnic	background,	which,	he	maintained,	are	 largely	 inapplicable	 to	 these	exogenous	materials.	 I	 shall	 call	 this	 “the	Schneider	 Narrative,”	 repeated,	 seemingly	 endlessly,	 by	 Witherspoon	 (see	 below)	 and	Schneider’s	other	admirers	(e.g.	Carsten	2004;	DeMallie	1994;	Schweitzer	2000).	It	there-
	This	being	so,	I	should	add	that	a	complete	coverage	of	what	has	been	published	on	the	Navajo	is	virtually	1impossible.	I	have	tried	to	read	most	of	the	more	frequently	cited	books	and	articles,	but	I	still	welcome	cor-rectives	to	(or	con*irmation	of)	my	analyses	from	those	better	acquainted	with	the	pertinent	literature.	
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fore	should	come	as	no	surprise	that	Schneider	provided	an	Introduction	to	Navajo	Kinship	
and	Marriage,	calling	it	“the	de*initive	statement”	on	its	subject	(1975:vii).	By	contrast,	Harold	Schef*ler	is	best-known	for	a	theory	of	kinship	that	grounds	kin-ship	phenomena	in	nuclear	family	concepts	and	relations.	This	grounding	was	made	explic-it	early	in	Hal	Schef*ler’s	career	when	he	noted	that	different	 societies	 perceive	 “the	 facts	 of	 procreation”	 differently,	 …	 but	 they	 differ	only	within	 certain	 clear	 limits	….	 All	 such	 theories	 provide	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 a	“genitor”	 and	 “genetrix”	 (parents),	 their	 offspring,	who	 are	 related	 to	 one	 another	(as	 “siblings”)	…	and	…	 for	 the	existence	of	…	genealogical	 relations	 [among]	 such	persons.	 Kinship	 as	 a	 cultural	 phenomenon	has	 to	 do	 *irst	 and	 foremost	with	 any	particular	person’s	…	relationships	with	other	persons	as	these	are	…	conceived	to	result	from	what	his	culture	takes	to	be	“the	facts	of	procreation.”	…	[I]t	is	the	triad	self-genitor-genetrix	that	should	be	considered	to	be	the	“atom”	of	kinship.	For	it	is	that	unit	which	“generates”	the	elements	“brother”	and	“sister.”	…	Clearly,	then,	the	elementary	 relations	of	 a	 kinship	 system	are	parent/child,	 husband/wife,	 and	 sib-ling/sibling	…	These	are	of	course	the	constituent	relationships	of	the	nuclear	family	(Schef*ler	1966:83-84).	The	main	purpose	of	this	article	is	to	show	that	Schef*ler’s	ideas	are	in	fact	closer	to	those	of	the	Navajo	than	Witherspoon’s	are,	despite	the	latter’s	repeated	assertions	that	he	has	captured	what	may	be	dubbed	“the	native’s	point	of	view.”	I	hasten	to	add	that	I	have	great	respect	for	Witherspoon’s	painstaking	analysis	of	Navajo	metaphysics	(see	esp.	With-erspoon	1977;	Witherspoon	and	Peterson	1995),	and	even	more	respect	 for	his	personal	devotion	to	the	Navajo.	His	analysis	of	Navajo	kinship,	by	contrast,	is,	seriously	*lawed	–	an	assertion	I	intend	to	justify	in	most	of	the	rest	of	this	article.	From	there	I	proceed	to	Navajo	notions	of	gender,	because	–	and	this	is	less	well-known	–	Schef*ler	broached	gender	classi-*ication,	and	because	his	analysis	here	 is	of	a	piece	with	his	arguments	about	human	kin-ship.	Finally,	 I	shall	have	something	to	say	about	scholarly	standards,	which,	I	shall	argue,	the	many	admirers	of	David	Schneider	have	violated	with	a	vengeance.	
2.0	Prolegomenal	Matters	But	*irst	I	need	to	go	into	more	detail	on	Schef*ler’s	arguments.	His	central	idea	is	focality,	which	I	shall	mostly	render	as	semantic	centrality.	Although	he	is	best	known	for	applying	this	idea	to	genealogically-	based	extension	rules,	about	which	I	shall	have	more	to	say	later,	there	are	at	least	six	more	applications	of	this	concept	in	his	published	corpus.		(1)	In	his	analysis	of	kin	classi*ication	on	Choiseul	Island,	now	part	of	the	indepen-dent	Solomon	Islands	(Schef*ler	1965),	he	points	out	that	although	more	distant	kin	are	su-per*icially	classed	with	one’s	parents,	siblings,	children,	and	other	close	kin,	these	latter	are	said,	 in	native	parlance,	 to	be	the	 ‘true’	members	of	their	respective	kin	classes	(Schef*ler	1965:75,	 81).	 In	 other	words,	 close	 procreative	 kin	 provide	 the	 foci	of	 the	 pertinent	 kin	classes,	a	set	of	models	for	these	classes,	to	which	other	members	of	the	classes	are	likened	as	 their	 extensions.	 These	 conclusions	 are	 underscored	 by	 the	 Choiseulese	 expression	
lavala.	 Here,	 Schef*ler	 (1965:750)	 instances	 one’s	 actual	 father,	 to	whom	 this	 expression	can	 never	 apply.	 Instead,	 the	 father	 can	 be	 referred	 to	 as	mama,	 i.e.	 by	 the	 lexically	 un-marked	‘father’	term	–	much	as	when	an	English	speaker	speaks	of	my	father	he/she	is	not	referring	to	a	Catholic	priest.	Schef*ler	(1965:	75)	adds:	“That	mamae	denotes	true	father	…	
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(“blood”	in	Choiseulese	terms)	is	further	attested	to	by	the	fact	that	subsequent	husbands	of	the	mother	(step-fathers),	even	though	they	may	say	that	their	stepson	is	‘just	like	a	true	son,’	are	nevertheless	always	quali*ied	by	the	lavala	designation	….”	Lavala	signals	diminu-
tion	 from	 a	 focus. 	 Usage	 of	 this	 term	 indicates	 someone	 other	 than	 the	 Real	 McCoy.	 It	2seems	 reasonable	 to	 suggest	 that	 lavala	means	 “classi*icatory.”	 It	 should	 be	 emphasized	that	this	analysis	is	based	upon	native	semantic	distinctions:	it	is	by	no	means	an	exogenous	imposition	on	such	distinctions.	(2)	Further	evidence	for	semantic	centrality	is	presented	in	Schef*ler’s	re-analysis	of	some	of	Louis	Dumont’s	materials	on	 the	Tamil	 speakers	of	South	 India	 (Schef*ler	1977).	Here	he	–	Schef*ler	–	points	out	that	the	kin-terms	applicable	to	other	members	of	pertinent	classes	are	locally	rendered	by	reference	to	the	closest	procreative	kin	of	those	classes.	Thus	e.g.	 the	designation	of	 classi*icatory	 ‘fathers’	 bear	pre*ixes	which	 subclass	 them	as	 ‘small	fathers’	or	‘great	fathers’,	depending	on	their	ages	relative	to	one’s	genitor,	the	latter	native-ly	designated,	as	on	Choiseul,	as	one’s	‘true	father.’ 	3(3)	Still	another	piece	of	evidence	 for	 the	semantically	central	status	of	native	pro-creative	 notions	 in	 kin-reckoning	 stems	 from	David	 Schneider’s	 argument	 that	 American	kinship	 has	 two	 “distinctive	 features”	 –	 “common	 substance”	 and	 “code	 for	conduct”	 (Schneider	1968).	 Schef*ler	 (1976)	 argued	 instead	 that	normative	prescriptions	pertinent	to	kin	categories	–	in	America	and	elsewhere	–	are	dependent	upon	criteria	which	de*ine	those	categories	in	the	*irst	place,	and	that	there	is	no	reason	to	question	the	conclu-sion	that,	again	throughout	the	world,	these	criteria	are	founded	on	local	ideas	having	to	do	with	procreation.	(4)	 In	 his	 Choiseul	 analysis,	 Schef*ler	 (1965:69,	 91)	 refers	 to	 native	 expressions	which	he	 translates	as	 ‘father’s	 side’	and	 ‘mother’s	 side.’	This	 indicates	 that,	 although	kin	terms	are	applied	more	widely,	their	use	without	lexical	marking	indicates	one’s	actual	par-ents	–	much	as	when	I	say	my	mother	I	am	not	referring	to	my	Cub	Scout	den	mother	when	I	was	a	boy,	or	when	I	say	my	father	I	do	not	have	in	mind	the	man	who	superintended	the	funeral	service	I	attended	not	long	ago	for	an	Irish-American	friend.		(5)	Several	more	examples	can	be	found	in	Schef*ler’s	re-analysis,	with	Floyd	Louns-bury,	of	concepts	of	parental	connection	among	the	Siriono	of	the	Bolivian	Amazon	(Schef-*ler	 and	 Lounsbury	 1971),	 initially	 brought	 to	 anthropological	 attention	 through	 a	 well-known	 monograph	 authored	 by	 Allan	 Holmberg	 (1969).	 Thus,	 Schef*ler	 and	 Lounsbury	(1971:40)	tell	us	that	the	Siriono	
	 Research	 in	 semantic	 theory	 shows	 that	 categories	 are	 graded	 rather	 than	 dichotomous	 (D’Andrade	21995:104-21).	But	this	can	be	ignored	for	present	purposes	since	a	simple	focal/nonfocal	distinction	will	suf-*ice.	The	South	Indian	terminologies	are	especially	apt	partly	because	Dumont	(e.g.	1957)	claims	that	they	dis3 -play	“inherited	af*inity”	in	addition	to	consanguinity.	In	contrast,	Schef*ler	argues	that	all	of	the	terms	are	fun-damentally	consanguineal.	Moreover,	Dumont’s	position	was	accepted	by	Schneider,	as	evidenced	by	the	lat-ter’s	high	opinion	of	what	he	dubbed	“alliance	theory”	(Schneider	1965)	and	by	his	written	communications	with	me	 about	 a	 dozen	 years	 before	 his	 passing	 in	 1995.	 It	 seems	 reasonable	 to	 suggest	 that	 this	 opinion	owed	a	very	great	deal	 to	Schneider’s	anti-genealogical	approach	 to	kinship.	 It	 is	well	worth	noting,	 *inally,	that,	more	recent	ethnography	on	the	South	Indian	area	provides	overwhelming	support	for	Schef*ler’s	posi-tion	(e.g.	Busby	1997;	Clark-Deces	2014:39-41;	Good	1980).		
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impose	a	number	of	food	taboos	on	pregnant	women	and	…	their	husbands,	the	pre-sumed	genitors	of	their	unborn	children.	They	also	practice	a	form	of	[post-natal	rit-ual]	and	…	rationalize	 it	on	the	ground[s]	 that	 there	 is	some	sort	of	“intimate	con-nection”	between	both	parents	and	the	child,	such	that	an	event	affecting	them	will	affect	it,	too	…	Such	beliefs	and	customs	are	virtually	incomprehensible	unless	Siri-ono	presume	some	sort	of	substantial	and	enduring	connection	…	between	the	child	and	 its	presumed	genitor	and	genetrix.	Because	of	 their	nature,	 these	 connections	cannot	be	undone,	and	for	each	person	there	can	be	one	and	only	one	set	of	such	re-lationships.	They	 come	 into	being	with	him	 [or	her]	 and	 cannot	be	 created	at	 any	other	time	(e.g.	through	adoption).	Employing	a	dictionary	written	by	a	German	missionary	 to	 these	people,	 Schef*ler	and	Lounsbury	(1971:47)	perform	a	morphological	analysis	of	a	native	kin	term,	edidi	which	Holmberg	glosses	as	 ‘child’	…	meaning	“son”	or	“daughter.”	…	[Although	this	term	is	employed	in	a	“classi*icatory”	manner	it]	*igures	in	utterances	such	as	se	eri-
iri	atea,	“to	conceive	(or	engender)	a	child”;	…	girri	teakula,”to	give	birth”;	erirri	ubua	
he	or	eriiringi,	“fetus”;	tiri,	“one	who	was	 joined	with	her	(in	 the	stomach)	…”;	and	
tiri-mbae,	“one	who	has	or	can	have	no	children,	viz.,	sterile.”	Thus,	although	the	‘child’	term	is	used	more	widely,	its	semantic	associations	make	it	clear	that	its	procreative	signi*icance	is	semantically	central.	(6)	 Schef*ler’s	 initial	 employment	 of	 extension	 rules	was	 almost	 certainly	 derived	from	Lounsbury,	at	one	time	his	senior	colleague	at	Yale	(Shapiro	and	Read	2018).	Critics	(e.g.	D’Andrade	1970;	Tyler	1966;	Wallace	1965)	were	quick	to	point	out	 that	 these	rules	presupposed	a	universal	genealogical	grid	 for	which	there	was	no	real	evidence,	and	that	they	were,	in	the	parlance	of	the	day,	not	“psychologically	valid.”	Thus,	as	discussed	by	Read	(2018),	who	employs	an	example	from	my	own	*ieldwork	among	the	Aboriginal	people	of	northeast	Arnhem	Land,	Australia,	it	is	grammatically	possible,	assuming	the	focal	status	of	close	procreative	kin	and	employing	appropriate	suf*ices,	 to	 formulate,	 in	one	of	 the	 local	dialects,	 a	 construct	 translatable	 as	 ‘mother’s	brother’s	 son	or	daughter.’	But	when	 I	pre-sented	this	construct	to	my	informants,	asking	them	for	the	pertinent	kin-term,	they	were	utterly	*lummoxed.	By	contrast,	 they	were	entirely	at	home	when	I	asked	about	 ‘someone	sired	by	a	man	I	call	‘mother’s	brother’	(Shapiro	1982:274-76).	More	generally,	beyond	the	closest	procreative	kin	they	plainly	reckoned	kin-term	assignment	on	the	basis	of	relatively	clearly	stated	matri-	and	patri-*iliative	rules	(Shapiro	1981:34-38),	which	perforce	are	psy-chologically	valid.	As	discussed	by	Read	(2018),	there	are	clear	English	parallels.	Thus,	the	son	or	 daughter	 of	 someone	 I	 call	 “uncle”	 I	 call	 “cousin,”	 but	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 know	whether	this	“uncle”	is	my	MB,	FB,	FZH,	MZH,	or	“just	a	friend	of	the	family.”	Schef*ler,	 for	his	part,	was	aware	of	such	matters	of	psychological	validity.	The	key	publication	 in	 this	 regard	 is	his	 analysis	of	 kin	 classi*ication	of	 the	Baniata,	who,	 like	 the	Choiseulese,	 inhabit	 the	Solomon	Islands	(Schef*ler	1972).	This	 is	such	an	 important	con-tribution	that	it	merits	attention	in	some	detail.	Here	he	notes	that	the	[extension]	rules	posited	[here]	are	not	merely	my	analytical	constructs,	for	the	people	…	use	many	similar	rules,	both	of	de*inition	and	extension,	and	can	readily	state	them.	Of	course,	 they	do	not	express	them	in	exactly	the	same	way	as	I	have.	For	the	most	part,	their	rule-like	statements	…	are	more	speci*ic	and	less	general	…	
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than	 the	 rules	 [I	 state].	 For	 the	parent,	 child,	 and	 sibling	 terms	 the	 tendency	 is	 to	specify	 their	 [focal]	 senses	discursively	by	 statements	 such	as	 “my	 [‘father’]	 is	 the	man	who	engendered	me,”	my	[‘mother’]	 is	the	woman	who	gave	birth	to	me,”	and	my	[‘sibling’]	and	I	were	born	together;	we	have	the	same	mother	and	father”(Schef-*ler	1972:350).	Note	that	the	unmarked	use	of	native	kin	terms	signals	the	closest	procreative	kin:	item	(4)	above.	Such	kin	may	be	marked	by	a	term	which	Schef*ler	(1972:354)	renders	as	‘real,	true,	proper,	or	par	excellence’:	item	(1)	above.	Schef*ler	 (1972:367-68)	 further	 tells	us	 that	kin	 term	product	statements	 “may	be	used	…	to	specify	extended	ranges	of	terms.	For	example,	the	people	say	“the	[‘brother’]	of	my	[‘father’]	is	my	[‘father’]	also	….”	Moreover,	some	Baniata	made	statements	of	the	follow-ing	sort:	“my	father’s	brother	is	like	my	father	and	my	mother’s	[‘sister’]	is	like	my	mother,	so	their	children	are	 like	my	brothers	and	sisters”	(Schef*ler	1972:369;	emphasis	 in	origi-nal).	All	this	is	comparable	to	his	Choiseul	analysis	–	see	item	(1)	above.	The	foregoing	is	no	more	than	an	abbreviated	selection	from	Schef*ler’s	publications	of	his	attention	to	native	notions	of	semantic	primacy.	It	bears	emphasis	that	none	of	this	entails	Lounsbury-inspired	extension	rules.	Was	he	the	*irst	scholar	to	attend	to	these	no-tions?	Not	at	all!	With	the	exception	of	the	“distinctive	features”	contention	(item	3	above),	all	of	Schef*ler’s	arguments	 for	semantic	centrality	have	substantial	precedent.	The	rendi-tion	of	close	procreative	members	of	kin	classes	as,	in	local	parlance,	the	‘true’	members	of	these	 classes	was	 noted	 by	 Alexander	 Goldenweiser	more	 than	 eight	 decades	 ago	 in	 the	second	edition	of	his	introductory	text.	To	wit:	[I]n	many	primitive	tribes	the	terms	used	for	the	immediate	members	of	the	family	are	either	distinguished	from	the	same	terms	in	the	extended	sense	by	the	addition	of	some	particle,	or	terms	corresponding	to	“own”	are	used	…	Family	is	family,	what-ever	the	system	of	relationship	…	(Goldenweiser	1937:301).	Often	this	is	associated	with	lexical	markers	translatable	as	‘false’	or	some	other	in-dicator	of	secondary	semantic	status,	reserved	for	collateral	kin.	One	or	both	sets	of	mark-ers	can	be	found	in	the	systems	of	kin	classi*ication	of	such	well-studied	societies	as	Aborig-inal	Hawaii	(Handy	and	Pukui	1972:65-68),	the	Cree	(Speck	1918:151),	and	the	Mae	Enga	(Meggitt	1964).	Similarly,	 classi*ication	of	 collateral	 kin	by	 reference	 to	 the	 closest	 procreative	 kin	(item	2	above)	is	exempli*ied	in	many	systems	of	kin	classi*ication,	such	as	Bengali	(Inden	and	Nicholas	 1977),	Malay	 (Banks	 1974)	 and	Tamil	 (Beck	1972:216).	 Cover	 expressions,	like	 ‘mother’s	 side’	 and	 ‘father’s	 side’(item	4	 above)	 or	 teknonymous	usage,	which	 imply	that,	when	kin	terms	are	used	without	lexical	marking	they	refer	to	primary	kin,	have	been	reported	for	Fiji	(Ravuvu	1971),	Tikopia	(Firth	1936),	and	the	Aboriginal	Australian	people	of	 northeast	 Arnhem	 Land	 (Shapiro	 1981),	 among	many	 others.	 The	 procreative	 signi*i-cance	of	kin	terms,	emphasized	by	Schef*ler	and	Lounsbury	for	the	Siriono	(item	5	above),	was	*irst	noted	more	widely	by	Westermarck	(1894:88	et	seq.).	Finally,	the	sort	of	native	ex-tension	rules	which	Schef*ler	noted	for	the	Baniata	have	been	called	“kin	term	products”	by	Dwight	 Read	 (e.g.	 2018),	 who	 provides	 several	 examples	 of	 their	 ubiquity	 in	 the	 ethno-graphic	record.	Before	 the	 Navajo	 materials	 can	 be	 tackled	 directly,	 a	 *inal	 prolegomenal	 matter	needs	to	be	stressed.	In	all	of	the	ethnographic	cases	with	which	he	deals,	Schef*ler	is	con-
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cerned	with	native	notions	of	biological	paternity,	not	what	has	been	called	“social	paterni-ty.”	He	was	 particularly	 critical	 of	 the	 claims	 that	 in	 some	 societies	 paternity	 is	 assigned	without	question	to	the	mother’s	husband,	for	example,	by	the	payment	of	bridewealth,	or	there	being	no	knowledge	of	the	relation	between	sex	and	conception,	such	that	paternity	is	
ipso	 facto	assigned	 the	husband.	 In	what	 is,	by	my	 lights	and	 to	 this	day	 the	best	general	statement	on	human	kinship	(Schef*ler	1973),	he	points	out	that	[i]t	is	often	taken	as	a	legal	presumption	…	that	a	woman’s	husband	…	is	the	genitor	of	her	offspring.	But	 this	presumption	…	 is	widely	regarded	as	rebuttable.	…	[T]he	ethnographic	record	offers	little	if	any	reliable	evidence	that	[parental]	relations	es-tablished	out	of	wedlock	are	ever	totally	discounted	…	(Schef*ler	1973:753-54)	In	a	nutshell,	native	concepts	of	fatherhood	are	elements	sui	generis:	they	are	not	de-rived	from	relationships	with	mothers.	This	is	germane	to	the	Navajo	case,	as	we	shall	see.	In	 the	 same	 encyclopedic	 article,	 and	 referring	 to	 the	 “ignorance	 of	 paternity”	 claims	 for	certain	 societies,	 Schef*ler	 (1973:749-51)	 refers	 to	 earlier	 ethnographic	 reports	 which	make	 it	plain	 that	 the	alleged	entry	 into	 the	mother	by	a	spirit-being	 is	not	held	 to	cause	conception,	 as	 the	 “ignorance”	 theory	 maintains,	 but	 rather	 is	 posited	 to	 occur	 at	 fetal	quickening:	it	is	a	native	theory	of	viviEication	of	an	already	formed	fetus.	All	this	being	so,	Schef*ler	 is	 led	to	the	following	seminal	conclusion:	“The	elemen-tary	relations	of	any	kinship	system	are	…	those	of	genitor-offspring	and	genetrix-offspring	…	 “	 (Schef*ler	 1973:755).	 This	 of	 course	 is	 a	 re-statement	 of	 the	 conclusion	 Schef*ler	reached	seven	years	earlier	(see	above).	
3.0	Navajo	Kinship:	A	SchefDlerian	Analysis	I	 can	now	 turn	directly	 to	 the	Navajo	materials.	 I	 begin	with	 the	 sort	 of	 analysis	which	 I	think	Schef*ler	would	make,	focusing	on	the	nuclear	family	as	a	residential	unit	and	as	a	na-tive	concept,	and	to	wider	spheres	of	kin	according	to	these	concepts.	From	there	I	proceed	to	 Witherspoon’s	 analysis	 of	 these	 materials,	 which	 is	 in	 crucial	 respects	 different,	 and	which,	I	shall	argue,	is	very	wide	of	the	mark.	All	my	sources	agree	that	the	Navajo	nuclear	family	occupies	its	own	dwelling,	sur-rounded	by	mostly	uterine	kin	of	the	woman,	though	uterine	kin	of	the	man	provide	an	ac-ceptable	 and	 frequent	 alternative	 (Aberle	 1961:108,	 119,	 125,	 141,	 1980:124,	 1981:3-5;	Adams	1963:54-59,	63-64,	1983:393,	397,	407;	Adams	and	Ruf*ing	1977:64,	68;	Carr	et	al.	1939:245,	 255;	 Chisholm	 1983:43;	 Kelley	 1982:379-80;	 Kimball	 and	 Provinse	 1942:22;	Kluckhohn	and	Leighton	1974:100-04;	Lamphere	1977:70--83;	Levy	1962:782-83,	791;	Re-ichard	1928:51,	69-70;	Shepardson	1995:160,	165;	Shepardson	and	Hammond	1964:1033,	1966:90,	1970:44-46;	see	also	Chisholm	1981,	1983:62).		There	are	native	terms	for	‘kin,’	‘being	related	to,’	and	so	forth;	the	consensus	being	that	the	entailed	notions	apply	to	at	least	one’s	own	matri-clan,	the	matri-clan	of	one’s	fa-ther,	and	reciprocally,	those	whose	fathers	are	of	one’s	matri-clan;	often	these	are	also	ap-plied	 to	 one’s	 father’s	 fathers	 and	 mother’s	 fathers	 matri-clans,	 and,	 reciprocally,	 those	whose	father’s	fathers	and	mother’s	fathers	are	of	one’s	own	matri-clan	(Aberle	1980:125;	Jacobsen	and	Bowman	2019:60;	Lamphere	1977:74,	87;	Schwarz	1997:73-74);	Shepardson	
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1995:166). 	 And,	 correspondingly,	 Aberle	 (1980:126)	 reports	 an	 expression	 which	 he	4translates	 as	 ‘not	my	 kinsmen’	 (see	 also	 Aberle	 1961:201;	 Landar	 1962:989),	 though	 he	adds	 that	 the	 line	 between	 individuals	 so	 designated	 and	 ‘kin’	 is	 not	 consistently	 drawn.	Presumably,	 this	 is	 related	 to	 another	Navajo	 term,	 translatable	 as	 ‘my	 relatives	 of	 some	sort	or	other’	–	‘of	inde*inite	relationship’	--	which	can	be	applied	to	strangers,	presumably	to	feign	a	kin	relationship	(ibid.;	see	also	Jacobsen	and	Bowman	2019:65;	Landar	1962:988;	Reichard	 1928:86,	 1950:569-70;	 Shepardson	 and	 Hammond	 1970:205,	 216;	 Spencer	1947:48-49).	Aberle	also	notes	an	expression	translatable	as	‘incest,’	which	literally	means	“one	who	copulates	repeatedly	with	relatives”	and	applies	to	sex	“with	a	sibling	of	opposite	sex,	a	member	of	one’s	own	[matri-]clan,	…	[and]	a	member	of	one’s	father’s	[matri-]clan	…”	(Aberle	 1980:120;	 see	 also	 Kluckhohn	 and	 Leighton	 1974:100;	 Lamphere	 1977:73,	 87;	Shepardson	and	Hammond	1964:1033-34).	Still	 another	pertinent	expression	 is	 reported	by	Herbert	Landar	(1962:995):	he	translates	this	as	‘slender	relatives’	and	tells	us	that	they	“form	a	class	whose	members	are	tied	to	one	by	 feeble	threads	of	clanhood”	(see	also	 Ja-cobsen	and	Bowman	2019:68).	Finally,	Maureen	Schwarz	(1997:115)	notes	that	one’s	bodi-ly	emissions	“can	affect	 the	health	and	welfare	of	 the	 individual	and	…	her	or	his	kin	and	community	…”	(see	also	Leighton	and	Kluckhohn	1947:91-92;	Schwarz	1997:130).	All	this	suggests	 that	 Navajo	 ideas	 about	 kinship	 entail	 a	 “nonkin”	 category,	 admittedly	 applied	with	some	*lexibility,	and	that	parental	kin	and,	with	less	certainty,	grandparental	kin,	are	the	foci	of	native	kinship	ideas.	The	matri-clans	themselves	are	neither	residentially-based,	nor	do	 they	own	 land	 collectively	nor	act	 as	political	units	 (Aberle	1961:108-11,	1981:2;	Adams	1963:61,	 1983:393,	 409-10;	Downs	1972:36-37;	 Lamphere	 1977:89-90;	 Shepard-son	 and	 Hammond	 1970:52,	 57;	 Spencer	 1947:69;	 compare	 Kluckhohn	 and	 Leighton	1974:111-112;	Reichard	1928:20,	29). 	5The	triad	mother/father/child	is	not	isolated	just	residentially.	A	number	of	taboos	apply	to	a	pregnant	woman	and	the	father	of	the	child,	usually	her	husband.	Thus,	Flora	Bai-ley	tells	us	that	“as	soon	as	pregnancy	was	assured,	both	husband	and	wife	were	placed	un-der	numerous	prohibitions.	Chief	among	 these	were	 the	 taboos	of	 seeing	blood,	violence,	dead	animals,	 or	 ghosts”	 (Bailey	1950:48;	 see	 also	Bailey	1950:33-42,	58;	Franciscan	Fa-thers	1910:450,	496;	Haile	1943:78-79;	Kluckhohn	and	Leighton	1974:202;	Leighton	and	Kluckhohn	1947:13-14,	Reichard	1950:159,	173;	Schwarz	1997:123-27,	130,	2007:47-48;	Waxman	1990:190).	 Gladys	Reichard	 (1928:143)	 notes	 that	 the	 nuclear	 family	 of	 a	 dead	individual	 is	 expected	 to	 fast	 for	 a	 period,	 a	 restriction	 which	 “even	 appl[ies]	 to	 infants	[who]	may	not	be	nursed”	for	this	period	(see	also	Franciscan	Fathers	1910:454-56,	508).	All	this	implies,	as	Schef*ler	put	it	for	the	Siriono,	that	“such	beliefs	and	customs	are	virtual-ly	 incomprehensible	 unless	 [the	 people]	 presume	 some	 sort	 of	 substantial	 and	 enduring	connection	between	 the	 child	 and	 its	presumed	genitor	 and	genetrix”	 (see	above).	More-
	Aberle‘s	*indings	(Aberle	1980:125-26)	indicate	that	the	kin/nonkin	distinction	is	*lexible,	and	that	af*ines	4are	sometimes	rendered	as	kin,	presumably	as	an	indication	of	presumed	emotional	closeness.	See	also	Shep-ardson	and	Hammond	(1970:220-21,	240).	 Some	 of	my	 sources	 (Aberle	 1980:124,	 1981;	 Adams	 1963:59-60;	 Shepardson	 and	 Hammond	 1970:221,	5236-37)	speak	of	 “lineages”	among	 the	Navajo,	but	 these	appear	 to	be	no	more	 than	contingent	clusters	of	uterine	kin.	There	are	no	native	notions	of	“lineation”	(see	esp.	Lamphere	1977:90-93)	such	as	we	*ind	among	the	Somali	(Lewis	1994)	and	some	other	systems	in	northeast	Africa	and	adjoining	parts	of	southwest	Asia.	The	matter	has	been	theorized	by	Adams	(1983:411),	Murphy	(1979)	and	Shapiro	1971).
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over,	not	long	after	birth,	the	infant	is	placed	on	a	cradle	board	which	may	be	used	by	sub-sequent	children	“but	not	out	of	the	family”	(Bailey	1950:79;	see	also	Lamphere	1977:70;	Schwarz	1997:114).		Conception	in	the	*irst	place	is	said	to	be	caused	by	“[w]ater	from	a	man	and	(men-strual)	blood	from	a	woman”	(Bailey	1950:18;	see	also	Leighton	and	Kluckhohn	1947:13;	Schwarz	1997:69,	117,	259,	2007:162;	Wright	1982:388;	Wright	et	al.	1993:785).	Another	–	perhaps	contrastive	or	complementary	–	account	has	both	parents	contributing	“water”	to	form	the	fetus	(Bailey	1950:19).	Finally,	it	is	pertinent	to	note	that	Navajo	paternity	is	in	no	wise	based	on	marriage:	thus,	in	instances	of	adultery	the	child	is	af*iliated	with	its	geni-
tor’s	matri-clan,	which	 may	 or	 may	 not	 the	 matri-clan	 of	 the	 woman’s	 husband	 (Aberle	1961:129-30;	 see	 also	 Shepardson	 and	Hammond	 1970:169-70,	 189-91).	 This	 should	 be	kept	in	mind	in	considering	Witherspoon’s	argument	(see	below)	that	the	Navajo	father	is	construed	as	an	af*ine.	There	is	considerable	variation	in	Navajo	kin	classi*ication	(see	esp.	Freed	and	Freed	1970;	Landar	1962),	but	most	of	my	sources	indicate	that,	although	parents’	same-sex	sib-lings	are	super*icially	classed	with	the	pertinent	parent,	they	can	be	distinguished	as	‘older	mother,’	 ‘younger	mother,’	 ‘older	 father,’	and	 ‘younger	 father,’	depending	on	age	relative	to	the	 linking	 parent	 (Aberle	 1961:197;	 Chisholm	 1983:68;	 Downs	 1972:23,	 41;	 Freed	 and	Freed	1970:1441;	Shepardson	and	Hammond	197:88-89,	207-15,	219).	We	saw	this	pattern	earlier	in	Schef*ler’s	analysis	of	Tamil	kin	classi*ication,	and	here	again	it	indicates	that	bio-logical	parents	enjoy	semantically	central	status.	Reciprocally,	a	man	or	a	woman	may	dis-tinguish	his	or	her	own	children	from	those	of	his	or	her	parallel	siblings,	real	or	classi*ica-tory	(Aberle	1961:198).	A	variant	of	this	pattern	involves	rendering	all	parental	same-sex	(and	sometimes	opposite	sex)	siblings	as	‘little	mother’	or	‘little	father,’	with	a	comparable	argument	regarding	semantic	centrality:	indeed	this	is	made	even	plainer	by	Herbert	Lan-dar’s	 translation	 of	 ‘little	 father’	 as	 “one	who	 is	 a	minor	 replica	 of	my	 father”	 and	 ‘little	mother’	as	“one	who	is	a	minor	replica	of	my	mother”	(Landar	1962:989).	As	if	all	this	were	not	enough,	Landar	(1962:997)	notes	an	instance	in	which	one’s	own	sister	is	rendered	in	the	Navajo	language	as	the	‘real’	member	of	her	kin	class	–	this	being	established	by	the	na-tive	query	“Are	you	both	of	the	same	mother?”	There	is	also	teknonymous	usage,	such	that	(for	example)	an	individual	may	be	re-ferred	to	as	”X’s	 father,”	 in	which	case	one’s	biological	 father	 is	 intended	and	not	 just	any	member	of	his	kin	class	(Reichard	1928:100-01,	105;	Shepardson	and	Hammond	1970:119;	see	also	Landar	1962:993-94).	This	too	implies	focal	status	for	close	procreative	kin,	much	as,	once	again,	when	I	say,	my	father,	 I	refer	 to	 the	man	who	engendered	me	and	not	 to	a	Catholic	priest.	Step-parents,	for	their	part,	do	not	merit	the	focal	parental	terms:	they	are	classed	either	by	age	relative	to	the	linking	parent	or	as	af*ines	(Aberle	1961:200,	but	com-pare	Shepardson	and	Hammond	1970:221).	Relative	age	*igures	as	well	in	Navajo	kin	classi*ication.	For	example,	a	(real	or	classi-*icatory?)	mother’s	brother	who	is	younger	than	Ego	may	be	called	‘sister’s	son’	(Shepard-son	and	Hammond	1970:217-18,	223).	This	suggests	that	the	semantically	central	member	of	 the	 ‘mother’s	brother’	kin	class	 is	older	 than	Ego,	very	 likely	his	actual	MB	(ibid.:220),	
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and,	conversely,	that	the	conceptually	central	member	of	the	‘sisters’	son’	class,	is	younger	than	Ego,	likely	his	actual	ZS	(Ibid:223). 	6Outside	 Ego’s	 own	matri-clan	 and	 his	 father’s	 matriclan	 but	 inside	 the	 sphere	 of	close	procreative	kin,	kin	terms	are	applied	on	the	basis	of	the	kin	classi*ication	of	the	link-ing	 relative:	 thus,	 e.g.	 male	 members	 of	 one’s	 FF’s	 matri-clan	 are	 called	 ‘father’s	father’	 (Shepardson	 and	Hammond	1970:223-26).	 There	 is	 thus	 a	 Crow-like	 character	 to	this	 sphere,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 FF	 is	 the	 semantically	 central	 member	 of	 his	 kin	 class	(compare	Schef*ler	1973:767).	Comparable	considerations	apply	 to	 the	MF	kin	class.	And	since,	as	already	noted,	Ego’s	mother	and	father	are	the	foci	of	their	respective	kin	classes,	it	follows	that	semantic	centrality	in	Navajo	kin	classi*ication	is	provided	by	close	procreative	kin. 	7 There	 is	 evidence	 for	 performance-based	 kinship	 among	 the	 Navajo,	 albeit	 this	seems	 to	be	modeled	on	native	notions	of	procreation.	Thus,	 the	Franciscan	Fathers	note	that	“it	 is	reprehensible	to	marry	a	woman	with	whom	one	has	concluded	a	friendly	rela-tionship	by	frequent	visits	and	endearing	terms	…,	as	this	is	equivalent	to	consanguinity	with	
her”	(1910:433,	emphasis	added).	
4.0	 Gary	Witherspoon’s	 Schneiderian	 Analysis	 of	 Navajo	 Kinship	 and	 its	 De-
fects	It	is,	as	I	shall	argue	later,	pertinent	to	point	out	that	Witherspoon’s	writings	have	a	decided	“postmodern”	*lavor.	Both	his	*irst	book,	Navajo	Kinship	and	Marriage	(	Witherspoon	1975),	and	his	second,	Language	and	Art	 in	 the	Navajo	Universe	(Witherspoon	1977)	are	replete	with	 references	 to	 the	 Schneider	 Narrative	 (see	 below),	 and	 in	 his	 co-authored	 volume	comparing	 Navajo	 art	 and	 science	 with	 their	 Western	 counterparts	 he	 maintain	 s	 that	Western	science	 is	 “just	another	way	of	knowing”	(Witherspoon	and	Peterson	1995:109).	
Navajo	Kinship	and	Marriage,	despite	its	title,	takes	no	account	whatsoever	of	any	of	the	ev-idence	 for	 semantic	 centrality	 in	 Navajo	 kinship.	Moreover,	 and,	 remarkably	 enough,	 the	book	has	virtually	no	data	on	kin	classi*ication.	Yet	its	author	insists	that	his	analysis	is	re-spectful	of	Navajo	understandings,	pedantic	statements	such	as	the	following:	Many	 anthropologists	 make	 studies	 of	 systems	 of	 kinship	 and	 marriage	 with	 too	many	questions	answered	before	they	get	to	the	*ield.	They	already	know	that	kin-ship	 is	 the	 apprehension	 or	 misapprehension	 of	 genealogical	 relationship,	 that	
	Shephardson	and	Hammond	(1970:223)	indicate	that	kin	terms	are	“extended	…	by	analogy”	from	ego’s	fa6 -ther’s	“matrilineage”	to	less	closely	related	members	of	his	matri-clan,	but	exactly	what	“lineage”	is	to	be	con-strued	as	being	here	is	unclear	(see	previous	note),	as	also	is	what	Navajo	concept	is	entailed	by	“analogy.”	 For	 a	 fuller	 treatment	 of	 the	 principles	 employed	 in	Navajo	 kin	 classi*ication	 see	 Landar	 1962;	 Reichard	71928:74-87;	Shepardson	and	Hammond	(1970:204-40).	Carr	et	al...	(1939)	proffer	an	“alliance”	rendition	of	Navajo	marriage,	wherein	matri-clans	are	supposedly	“allied”	by	individual	unions,	but	they	present	no	evi-dence	for	such	an	“alliance”	other	than	clan	exogamy.	Such	a	rendition	is	of	course	common	in	the	theoretical	literature,	which	sees	no	need	to	inquire	as	to	what	rights	are	held	by	the	allegedly	“allied”	units	by	virtue	of	an	individual	marriage.	In	fact,	Navajo	marriages	are	arranged	by	close	kin	of	the	woman	and,	to	a	lesser	ex-tent,	 of	 the	 man	 (Aberle	 1961:124-26;	 Lamphere	 1977:40;	 Reichard	 1928:68-69;	 Shepardson	 1995:166;	Shepardson	and	Hammond	1970:86-87,	91,	170-76),	and	there	 is	no	evidence	whatsoever	that	such	unions	entail	rights	and	obligations	for	entire	clans.	The	matter	has	been	raised	–	and	to	my	mind	settled	–	for	Abo-riginal	Australia,	the	locus	classicus	of	“alliance	theory,”	by	Hiatt	(e.g.	1968)	and	myself	(Shapiro	e.g.	1968).
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kinsmen	are	not	af*ines	and	that	af*ines	are	not	kinsmen,	…	that	residence	is	either	patrilocal,	matrilocal,	 neolocal,	 or	 some	combination	of	 these,	…	 [and]	 that	 father-child	and	mother-child	are	both	relationships	of	the	*irst	order	…	[By	contrast]	I	try	to	avoid	molding	 the	Navajo	system	of	kinship	and	marriage	 into	 the	standard	an-thropological	categories.	Instead,	I	attempt	to	…	reveal	the	Navajo	system	according	to	its	own	features	…	(Witherspoon	1975:xi).	This	 is	 of	 course	 vintage	 Schneider.	 And,	 like	 its	 inspiration,	 it	 utterly	 misunder-stands	both	the	gist	of	previous	studies	(see	above)	and	the	nature	of	the	comparative	en-deavor.	 Thus	 the	 utility	 of	 established	 categories	 was	 questioned	 two	 decades	 earlier	 in	Goodenough’s	 seminal	 article	 on	 residential	 programs	 on	 the	Micronesian	 island	 of	 Truk	(Goodenough	1956).	 Schef*ler	 argued	as	 early	 as	 the	mid-1960s	 (Schef*ler	1966)	 that	 fa-ther-child	and	mother-child	are	indeed	“both	relationships	of	the	*irst	order”	–	something	already	noted.	And	it	was	established	years	earlier	that	kinsmen	can	be	af*ines	as	well,	as	evidenced	e.g.	 by	parallel	 cousin	marriage	 in	most	of	 the	 Islamic	world	 (e.g.	Murphy	and	Kasdan	1959).	Witherspoon	thus	evidences	a	highly	truncated	appreciation	of	the	history	of	kinship	 studies.	 In	 fact	Navajo	Kinship	and	Marriage	 utterly	 ignores	 several	decades	of	previous	 ethnographic	 theory:	 its	 only	 comparative	 reference	 is	 to	 Schneider’s	American	
Kinship.	Even	worse,	 it	 fails	 utterly	 to	 appreciate	 the	nature	of	 ethnographic	 comparison.	Thus	Goodenough’s	most	 important	 contribution	was	his	 argument	 that	 the	 comparative	enterprise	requires	an	external	schedule	of	primitive	elements	by	virtue	of	which	compari-son	can	be	effected,	much	as	the	catalogue	of	phonemes	in	linguistics. 	Witherspoon	tacitly	8employs	such	a	list	by	his	insistence	that	it	is	Navajo	kinship	and	marriage	which	is	his	con-cern:	otherwise,	he	is	left	only	with	what	he	takes	to	be	native	understandings,	unmoored	to	the	logically	prior	notions	signaled	by	the	expression	“kinship	and	marriage.”	In	short,	if	such	systems	vary	so	profoundly;	what	justi*ies	labeling	them	this	way?	Most	of	Witherspoon’s	 claims	about	Navajo	 conceptualizations	are	either	 self-con-tradictory,	or	unrelated	to	speci*iable	ethnographic	operations,	or	entirely	 false.	Thus,	de-spite	his	claim	that	cultures	differ	virtually	kaleidoscopily	in	their	kinship	notions,	we	learn	that	Navajo	 render	 the	 sibling	 relationship	 as	 “those	with	whom	one	 came	up	out	 of	 the	same	womb”	(Witherspoon	1975:16).	Now	this	particular	idiom	seems	to	me	rather	close	to	 my	 own,	 allegedly	 biased	 Euro-American	 sense	 of	 siblingship.	 Admittedly,	 the	 Navajo	conception	of	this	relation	may	embrace	more	people	than	mine	does,	but	if	they	apply	this	idiom	to	classi*icatory	siblings	too	–	it	is	not	clear	that	they	do	–	,	then	this	is	plain	evidence	that	they	construe	it	primarily	in	procreative	terms.	The	point,	alas,	is	entirely	lost	on	With-erspoon.		Then	there	is	his	assertion	that	among	the	Navajo	“[t]he	acts	of	giving	birth	and	sus-tenance	are	imbued	with	meaning	…,	and	this	meaning	can	be	described	as	…	diffuse,	en-during	solidarity”	(1975:20).	This	too	is	of	course	straight	from	Schneider.	Utterly	ignored	in	this	impressionistic	rendition	are	the	*ield	operations	to	which	it	might	conceivably	per-tain.	 It	 is	not,	presumably,	a	 translation	of	a	Navajo	expression,	but	then	what	 is	 it	ethno-graphically?	We	are	left	without	an	answer.		
	Goodenough’s	argument	here	 is	relatively	 implicit	 in	his	Truk	essay	but	more	expressly	stated	 in	his	 later	8publications	(e.g.	Goodenough	1970,	1981).	It	should	also	be	noted	here	that	there	are	important	connections	between	 Goodenough’s	 writings	 on	 ethnographic	 description	 and	 comparison	 and	 Schef*ler’s	 thought	(Shapiro	and	Read	2018).
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The	 lack	of	rigor	 in	Witherspoon’s	analysis	 is	compounded	by	his	 treatment	of	 the	mythical	 *igure	 of	 Changing	Woman,	 noted	 by	 other	 ethnographers	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 Primeval	Female,	associated	with	the	earth	(see	esp.	Schwarz	1997)	and	said	to	be	in	the	Navajo	lan-guage	‘our	mother’	(Witherspoon	1975:20).	About	this	apparently	*igurative	usage	Wither-spoon	has	this	to	say:	Such	 references	 to	 kinship	 with	 the	 earth	 have	 previously	 been	 categorized	 as	metaphorical.	 I	 believe	 that	 this	 reference	 to	 the	 earth	 as	 our	mother	 is	 based	 on	more	 than	 simply	 a	metaphorical	 extension	 of	 the	 concepts	 of	 kinship.	 In	 Navajo	mythology,	 the	earth	was	 the	 source	of	 life	 for	all	beings	 through	 their	emergence	from	 the	 underworlds.	 In	 this	 act	 of	 emergence,	 the	 earth	 gave	 birth	 to	 all	 living	creatures.…	The	emotional	…	tie	between	the	Navajo	and	the	earth	is	also	strong	and	intense.	 Thus	 by	 every	 Navajo	 concept	 and	 de*inition,	 the	 earth	 is	 a	 …	 true	kinswoman	(1975:20;	see	also	Witherspoon	1970:58).	No	 it’s	 not!	 That	 the	 earth	 is	 said	 to	 “give	 birth	 to	 all	 living	 creatures”	 suggests	strongly	that	it	is	metaphorically	modeled	on	the	birthing	activity	of	*lesh-and-blood	Navajo	women	 (Franciscan	 Fathers	 1910:354;	 Schwarz	 1997:15).	 Elsewhere,	 Witherspoon	(1970:58)	seems	to	recognize	this	when	he	writes	that	“[a]ll	beings	had	their	origin	in	the	underworlds	and	have	 their	existence	here	because	 they	symbolically	came	up	out	of	 the	womb	of	the	earth.”	In	any	case,	there	is	no	indication	in	the	pertinent	literature	–	not	even	rhetorically	–	that	the	earth	is	said	to	be	a	‘true’	mother	or	otherwise	ascribed	semantically	central	status,	which	status	is	apparently	enjoyed,	as	we	have	seen,	only	by	one’s	biological	mother.		Still,	upon	*irst	reading	Witherspoon’s	contention,	I	wondered	if	I	could	*ind	a	plain-er	 statement	 of	 such	modeling	 in	 the	 extant	 ethnographic	 literature.	My	 search	was	only	partly	 successful.	 I	 could	 *ind	 nothing	 of	 this	 kind	 regarding	 Changing	 Woman,	 but	 the	Navajo	residential	edi*ice,	the	so-called	“hogan”	(an	Anglicized	version	of	a	Navajo	lexeme)	is	also	said	to	be	a	‘mother,’	and	Maureen	Schwarz	(1997:44)	quotes	an	informant’s	remark	as	follows:	“This	home	provides	a	place	for	you	to	sleep	and	rest	and	eat	and	enjoy	yourself,	
just	 like	the	way	your	…	mother	takes	care	of	you”	(emphasis	added).	 In	short,	 the	mother	provides	a	model	 for	a	rendition	of	 the	hogan,	which	 is	 likened	to	a	mother.	Note	 too	that	when	this	informant	employed	the	 ‘mother’	 lexeme,	 it	was	clear	that	the	reference	was	to	the	biological	mother,	something	we	have	come	across	before.	Presumably,	the	metaphorical	rendition	of	Changing	Woman	as	‘mother’	is	related	to	the	equally	*ictive	notion	that	all	Navajo	are	kin	(	Witherspoon	1970:58)	–	something	which	is	surely	comparable	to	the	Judeo-Christian	idea	that,	as	children	of	a	single	Creative	Being,	all	 people	 are	brothers	 and	 sisters.	 In	neither	 case	do	 such	embracive	 assertions	gainsay	kin/nonkin	distinctions.		Then	there	is	Witherspoon’s	assertion	that	“Navajo	de*ine	kinship	in	terms	of	action	or	behavior,	not	in	terms	of	substance”	(1975:21).	This	can	hardly	be	the	case	because	be-havioral	norms	pertaining	to	kinsmen	depend	upon	those	criteria	by	which	kin	are	separat-ed	 from	nonkin	 in	 the	 *irst	 place,	 and	 there	 is,	 as	we	have	 seen,	 no	 reason	 to	 argue	 that	these	criteria	are	not	procreation-based.	It	is	worth	noting	that	this	is	much	the	same	error	that	Schef*ler	pointed	out	in	Schneider’s	study	of	American	kinship	(see	above).	There	is	more.	Witherspoon	tells	us	that	“[t]he	primary	bond	in	the	Navajo	kinship	system	is	the	mother-child	bond	…”	(1975:21).	It	is	unclear	that	“primary”	here	has	any	op-
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erational	meaning,	and	if	we	allow	it	intuitively,	it	is	also	unclear	how	Navajo	kinship	differs	from	kinship	anywhere	else.	Mothers	seem	everywhere	to	be	motherly.	A	 chapter	 of	Navaho	Kinship	 and	Marriage	 is	 devoted	 to	 af*inal	 ties.	Here	Wither-spoon	 asserts	 that	 “the	 primary	 symbol	 of	 af*inal	 solidarity	 is	 found	 in	 sexual	intercourse”	 (1975:23).	Thus	once	again	 there	 is	 indebtedness	 to	Schneider	on	American	kinship,	and	once	again	“primary”	is	used	entirely	intuitively.	Moreover,	in	what	sense	can	sexual	intercourse	be	construed	as	a	symbol?	The	symbols	that	at	least	some	of	us	employ	in	everyday	 life,	 like	 the	Christian	 cross	or	 the	 red/green	contrast	 in	 traf*ic	 lights,	have	a	public	character,	but	there	is	evidence	that	the	Navajo,	like	most	other	people,	regard	sex	as	a	decidedly	private	matter	(Csordas	1989:478;	Kluckhohn	and	Leighton	1974:91;	Leighton	and	 Kluckhohn	 1947:88;	 Schwarz	 2007:89).	 And	 Navajo	 men	 are	 enjoined	 markedly	 to	avoid	 their	mothers-in-law,	which	 avoidance	 seems	 especially	 to	 entail	 profound	 restric-tions	on	sexual	activity	(Aberle	1961:150-51;	Bailey	1950:56;	Downs	1972:38;	Franciscan	Fathers	1910:447,	449;	Reichard	1928:71-72,	88,	140;	Shepardson	1995:167;	Shepardson	and	Hammond	1970:175;	Spencer	1947:51).	In	this	regard,	it	is	pertinent	to	consider	Witherspoon’s	suggestion	“that	the	Navajo	father-child	relationship	might	be	best	characterized	by	af*inity”	 (1975:30).	This	 rests	on	the	following	considerations:	First,	“the	intensity	or	closeness	of	the	father-child	relation-ship	 varies	 proportionally	 to	 the	 intensity	 or	 closeness	 of	 the	 father-mother	relationship”	(ibid.).	Second,	“Navajo	children	often	refer	to	and	address	their	father	as	an	in-law.	The	term	[translatable	as]	‘male	in-law	of	a	proximate	generation’	is	often	used	in	a	joking	context	by	a	Navajo	child	in	referring	to	his	father”	(1975:31).	Third,	at	least	accord-ing	to	some	informants,	a	man	may	marry	a	woman	of	his	father’s	matri-clan	(ibid).	Fourth,	and	*inally,	marriage	of	a	man	to	his	wife’s	daughter	by	another	man	is	permitted	and,	ap-parently,	fairly	common	(ibid.)		None	of	these	arguments,	I	submit,	is	decisive.	The	emotional	closeness	of	the	moth-er-child	bond,	even	if	supported	by	non-impressionistic	evidence,	is	irrelevant	to	the	nature	of	any	other	relationship.	If	it	were	otherwise,	and	given	the	same	reasoning,	then	(e.g.)	the	sibling	tie,	it	could	be	argued,	is	one	of	af*inity.	In	fact	Witherspoon’s	contention	rests	on	his	impression,	already	noted,	that	the	mother-child	bond	is	“primary.”	That	a	man	or	woman	may,	under	certain	conditions,	marry	someone	of	his/her	father’s	matri-clan	has	no	neces-sary	bearing	on	the	af*inal	status	of	that	clan	with	regard	to	Ego:	it	may	simply	signify	that	certain	consanguineal	relatives,	as	 locally	construed,	may	marry.	 In	 this	regard	It	 is	perti-nent	 to	 repeat	 that	 individuals	 of	 one’s	 father’s	matri-clan	 are	 held	 to	 be	 ‘kin.’	Much	 the	same	argument	applies	 to	a	marriage	between	a	man	and	his	wife’s	daughter	by	another	man.	 More	interesting	is	address	and	reference	to	one’s	father	as	‘male	in-law	of	a	proxi-mate	generation.’	This,	as	noted,	has	a	ludic	character,	which	is	to	say	that	it	is	not	taken	se-riously.	James	Downs	(1972:40)	reports	what	appears	to	be	the	same	playful	usage:	Joking	with	parents	…	usually	refers	to	membership	in	clans.	A	boy	can	for	instance	refer	to	his	mother	as	‘woman	who	married	into	my	father’s	clan,’	and	thus	speak	of	her	as	an	in-law	…	Such	joking	might	be	called	a	play	on	kinship	just	as	we	make	plays	
on	words	(Downs	1972:40;	emphasis	added;	see	also	Aberle	1961:152-53).	If	 taken	 in	earnest	–	as	 it	 should	not	be	–,	 and	using	Witherspoon’s	 reasoning,	we	might	conclude	from	this	that	a	Navajo	regards	his/her	mother	as	an	af*ine	–	a	conclusion	
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entirely	 at	 odds	with	 his	 own	 analysis.	He	 seems	 to	 recognize	 its	 shortcomings	when	he	writes	 that	 “the	 Navajo	 father	 is	 related	 to	 his	 children	 by	 both	 kinship	 and	af*inity”	(1975:34).	But	even	this	modi*ication	is	unwarranted:	we	have	seen	that	all	the	ev-idence	for	the	af*inal	status	of	the	father	is	questionable,	and	that	all	ethnographers	report	that	he	is	reckoned	as	‘kin.’	Finally,	there	is	a	Navajo	myth	in	which	an	archetypal	personage	entertains	“doubts	about	[his]	paternity”	(Mindeleff	1898:33)	--	which	doubts	would	be	unlikely	if	this	“pater-nity”	were	established	by	marriage	negotiations,	 the	marriage	ceremony,	and	the	ensuing	cohabitation,	 all	 of	 which	 are	 quite	 public	 (e.g.	 Aberle	 1961:124-28;	 Franciscan	 Fathers	1910:422-23,	446-49;	Reichard	1928:68-70;	Shepardson	and	Hammond	1970:170-76).	Several	scholars	in	addition	to	Schef*ler	have	pointed	out	the	scholarly	sloppiness	of	Schneider’s	 American	 Kinship	 (Fogelson	 2001;	 Kuper	 1999;	 Wallace	 1969).	 Yet	 Wither-spoon	is	undeterred:	Navajo	Kinship	and	Marriage,	I	would	suggest,	is	indebted	at	least	as	much	to	Schneider’s	undisciplined	analysis	as	it	is	to	anything	reportable	from	the	Navajo	*ield.	 In	 the	 Introduction	 to	 his	 second	 book,	Language	 and	 Art	 in	 the	 Navajo	 Universe,	Witherspoon	states	that	“[a]	kinship	system	is	ultimately	based	on	a	theory	of	reproduction	…”	(1977:4).	This	is	a	surprisingly	Schef*lerian	conclusion:	one	can	*ind	several	statements	to	this	effect	in	Schef*ler’s	corpus	(e.g.	see	above	and	Schef*ler	1966:83-84).	Moreover,	this	volume	has	better	data	on	Navajo	kinship	conceptions.	Here	Witherspoon	provides	the	pat-tern,	already	noted,	wherein	the	‘mother’	and	‘father’	terms	are	modi*ied	for	collateral	kin,	who	are	rendered	with	reference	to	the	linking	parents.	But	he	fails	to	see	the	implications	of	this	*inding	for	his	analysis,	which	otherwise	has	much	the	same	relativistic	and	didactic	quality	as	Navaho	Kinship	and	Marriage.	Thus,	after	an	abbreviated	coverage	of	Navajo	cre-ation	myths,	which	 involve	 cerebral	 and	oral	 generation,	we	are	 told	 that	 “[t]hinking	and	singing	the	world	into	existence	attributes	a	de*inite	kind	of	power	to	thought	and	song	to	which	most	Westerners	are	not	accustomed.	It	is	rather	obvious	that	the	Navajo	ontological	conception	of	thought	and	speech	is	very	different	from	our	own”	(1977:17;	see	also	With-erspoon	and	Peterson	1995:16).	But	this	is	surely	not	the	case.	In	the	Book	of	Genesis	God	creates	by	speaking,	and	the	Book	of	John	begins	with	Jesus	being	rendered	as	The	Word;	in	both	 instances	 there	 is	 an	 at	 least	 implied	 contrast	 with	 sexual	 generation	 (Shapiro	1989:and	references	therein).	This	has	Navajo	parallels:	 thus,	Changing	Woman	is	held	to	create	by	externalizing	her	non-sexual	bodily	emissions	(Franciscan	Fathers	1910:356,	427;	Schwarz	1997:62-67,	2007:32;	compare	Munn	1970).There	is,	I	suggest,	more	than	a	super-*icial	parallel	between	Navajo	ritual	chants,	which	employ	the	bright	colors	of	dry	paintings	(aka	sandpaintings).	and	this	presentation,	which	I	dare	to	hope	will	be	 illuminating,	per-haps	even	seminal.		Closer	 to	 the	 ground,	 there	 is	 the	 same	 contention	 that	 the	mother/child	 bond	 is	“primary”	 (1975:85),	 without	 any	 operational	 speci*ication	 as	 to	 what	 “primary”	 might	mean,	and	 the	same	charge	 that	 the	attribution	of	kinship	 to	 those	other	 than	humans	 is	metaphorical	is	simply	a	Eurocentric	projection	(1977:86,	91-94).	We	are	told	as	well	that	“Navajo	 relations	of	kinship	are	…	de*ined	by	actions	and	not	 substances”	 (1977:85),	 the	latter,	presumably,	being	the	case	among	Euro-Americans.	But	one	of	these	“actions”	is	held	to	be	giving	birth,	which	is	surely	signi*icant	outside	Navajo	country.	The	other	is	“sharing	sustenance,”	 similarly	widespread	 and	 in	 both	 cases,	 for	 reasons	 already	 noted,	 logically	dependent	upon	prior	local	de*initions	of	kinship.	
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Witherspoon	here	provides	an	extensive	discussion	of	the	Navajo	‘kin’	term	noted	by	previous	ethnographers,	 telling	us	 in	 the	process	 that	 it	 allows	kinship	 to	 extend	beyond	“those	who	share	common	substance”	so	as	to	apply	to	“any	persons	who	act	according	to	the	behavior	code	of	kinship,”	as	well	as,	tactically,	to	anyone	who	an	individual	is	trying	to	engage	 (1977:88;	 see	 also	 Landar	 1962:988;	Witherspoon	 and	 Peterson	 1995:10).	 Once	again,	he	fails	to	appreciate	that	such	a	code	stems	from	a	speci*ication	of	the	criteria	which	posit	kinship	in	the	*irst	place,	and	to	see	that	many	Euro-American	institutions	are	closely	comparable.	Brother,	can	you	spare	a	dollar?	At	one	point,	Witherspoon	seems	to	recognize	that	Navajo	behavioral	norms	for	kin	are	logically	dependent	on	a	prior	statement	of	what	kinship	is	in	the	*irst	instance.	Thus	he	notes	that	kin	classes	are	“constructed	and	differentiated	with	regard	to	…	giving	birth	and	the	relatively	de*inite	…	attributes	of	 sex,	generation,	 lineality,	and	age.	…	 [T]hese	classes	are	strictly	and	solely	de*ined	by	who	gave	[an	individual]	birth	and	for	whom	the	birth	was	given	[i.e.	the	idiom	of	paternal	connection].…	Ongoing	behavioral	relationships	or	the	lack	of	 them	have	 absolutely	 nothing	 to	 do	with	 one’s	membership	 in	 any	 of	 these	 classes	…	“	(1977:95).	Once	again,	we	have	a	decidedly	Schef*lerian	statement,	and	one	followed	by	an	admirable	analysis	of	the	data	pertinent	to	it.	But	this	in	turn	is	followed	by	the	assertion	that,	for	the	Navajo,		there	are	only	two	primary	or	unmediated	relationships.	These	exist	between	hus-band	and	wife	and	between	mother	and	child.	The	mother	is	the	focal	point	in	both	of	these	relationships,	for	both	involve	a	different	relationship	to	her	womb.	It	is	she	who	provides	the	link	between	the	father	and	the	children	…	(1977:105-06).	In	 short,	 and	 again,	 the	mother	 is	 “primary,”	 the	 father	 not:	 elsewhere	 in	Wither-spoon’s	corpus	the	latter	is	rendered	as	“somewhat	secondary,	because	[the	relationship]	is	traced	 through	another	person”	 (Witherspoon	1970:59).”	 “The	 father-child	bond,”	we	are	asked	 to	believe,	 “is	 really	 just	another	extension	of	 the	husband-wife	bond.	 It	 ties	an	 in-marrying	man	with	children	who	have	the	same	cultural	 identity	as	the	mother”	(Wither-spoon	1959:59). 	All	 this,	 alas,	 runs	 counter	 to	 the	Navajo	notion	 that	 a	man	contributes	9something	 irreducible	 to	 the	 generation	 of	 his	 children,	 something	 on	 an	 ontological	 par	with	the	mother’s	contribution	(see	above).	Witherspoon	(1977:196-97)	notes	this,	but	is	too	intent	on	minimizing	Navajo	fatherhood	to	see	its	implication.		More	broadly,	Witherspoon	seems	intent	on	representing	the	Navajo	as	exemplars	of	some	of	the	primitivist	fantasies	of	our	times:	as	in	so-called	“matriarchy	theory”:	mothers	are	somehow	“primary”	and	there	is	kinship	with	nature,	and	among	all	people	–	or	at	least	all	Navajo.	By	contrast,	we	are	asked	to	accept	the	following:	In	the	West,	theories	that	explain	the	origin	and	nature	of	society	assume	the	indi-vidual	as	the	fundamental	reality.	Societies	arose	during	a	hypothetical	time	of	war	of	 individuals,	all	against	all.	The	warring	 individuals	at	some	point	came	together	and	decided	to	 form	a	society	 to	govern	themselves.	This	 is	known	…	as	 the	social	
	All	 this	 is	reminiscent	of	Malinowski’s	claim	that	the	Trobriand	father	is	said	to	be	a	 ‘stranger’	or	an	 ‘out9 -sider’	with	regard	to	his	children.	I	have	elsewhere	(Shapiro	2018b)	argued	that	this	is	a	metaphor,	and	that	he	is	in	fact	regarded	as	a	kinsman.	The	cited	article	should	be	consulted	for	a	detailed	argument	and	perti-nent	references.	
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contract.	…	Society	 is	 [thus]	a	 contingent	arrangement	of	 individuals	 that	partially	alters	the	natural	state	of	individuality	(Witherspoon	and	Peterson	1995:9).	This	Hobbesian	imagery	is	hardly	all	there	is	to	Western	social	theory.	A	more	com-prehensive	statement	would	have	to	include	patriotic	celebrations,	Holiday	dinners,	and	at	least	 the	more	staid	religious	services.	Also	necessary	 is	a	consideration	of	Navajo	witch-craft	 (Kluckhohn	 1944),	 adultery,	 and,	 in	 former	 times,	warfare	 (Hill	 1936).	 But	Wither-spoon	is	less	concerned	with	reasoned	comparison	than	with	writing	a	morality	play.		
5.0	Addendum	After	this	essay	was	largely	completed,	I	was	able	to	secure	the	*irst	two	volumes	of	lessons	on	 the	Navajo	 language	 by	 Father	 Berard	Haile	 (1941),	 a	 Catholic	missionary	who	 spent	most	of	his	adult	life	with	the	Navajo.	I	append	some	of	its	*indings	here,	partly	for	the	rea-son	just	noted	but,	more	importantly,	because	it	supplies	information	not	obtainable	(so	far	as	I	can	discern)	from	any	other	source.	Additionally,	as	will	be	seen,	it	bears	heavily	on	the	analyses	so	far	considered.	Father	Berard	distinguishes	between	the	“family”	kinship	terminology	of	the	Navajo	and	their	“clan”	terminology.	It	is	not	entirely	clear	that	this	distinction	is	achieved	lexically	by	 the	Navajo,	but	 in	any	 case,	we	 learn	 that	 actual	 siblings	may	be	 referred	 to	by	 terms	which	distinguish	them	from	classi*icatory	‘siblings’	(Haile	1941:58).	This	in	itself	does	not	allow	a	conclusion	concerning	 focality:	 there	 is	no	 indication,	 for	example,	 that	 the	 terms	can	be	translated	as	‘real’	or	‘true’	(see	above).	But,	as	we	have	seen,	the	‘sister’	kin-class	is	divided	into	‘real’	and	(by	default)	‘unreal’	subclasses,	so	it	seems	a	relatively	safe	bet	that	the	‘brother’	and	other	kin-classes	are	so	divided.	In	short,	it	would	seem	that	procreatively	close	kin	are	indeed	lexically	distinguished	from	others	of	their	kin-classes.	And	if	this	were	not	enough,	we	learn	from	Father	Berard	that	the	“family”	‘brother’	term	is	translatable	as	‘he	was	 produced	 or	 born	with	 him	or	 her’	 and	 that	 a	 pluralizing	 version	 of	 this	 lexeme	translates	 as	 ‘he	was	 produced	 (or	 born)	with	 them’	 (Haile	 1941:57,	 62).	 This	 is	 an	 un-equivocally	procreative	 idiom,	and	as	such	 it	provides	 the	strongest	evidence	 for	a	Schef-*lerian	interpretation	of	Navajo	kinship.	Witherspoon’s	 contrastive	 analysis	 can	be	 faulted	on	yet	 another	 front.	 Father	Be-rard	reports	a	 term	which	he	 translates	as	 ‘parents’	 (Haile	1941:60),	which	suggests	 that	one’s	father,	far	from	being	an	af*ine,	as	Witherspoon	contends,	is	conceptualized	as	being	on	a	logical	par	with	one’s	mother.	Another	term,	which	Father	Berard	tells	us	“is	applicable	to	both	parents,”	is	translatable	as	those	‘who	gave	us	birth’	and	is	used	among	actual	sib-lings	 (Haile	1941:79),	 thus	underscoring	both	 the	 logical	parity	of	one’s	parents	and	his/her	conceptualization	of	them	as	co-procreators.	
6.0	Navajo	Gender	ClassiDication		Schef*ler’s	contribution	to	gender	studies	is	to	be	found	in	a	contribution	to	feminist	schol-arship.	His	words:	Consider	 [the]	 claim	 that	 in	 some	 North	 American	 Indian	 societies	 “gender	 role”	rather		than	 genital	 anatomy	 determined	 …	 classi*ication	 as	 a	 male	 or	 female	 ….	[This]	argument	is	intended	to	liberate	gender	from	any	biological	basis	…	[and]	to	show	 that	 a	 system	of	 two	 genders	 is	 by	 no	means	 inevitable.	 [Such	 scholars]	 ac-
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knowledge,	however,	 that	 “gender	 role”	 is	de*inable	only	 as	…	behavior	normative	for	a	member	of	one	or	the	other	genital-sex	class	…	and	that	assignment	to	one	or	the	other	sex	class	is	typically	at	birth	and	not	dependent	on	any	…	behavior	on	the	part	of	the	person	being	classi*ied.	Because,	logically,	categories	must	be	de*ined	…	by	 criteria	 independent	 of	 the	 normative	 implications	 of	 inclusion	 in	 those	 cate-gories,	certain	forms	of	conduct	cannot	be	both	criteria	for	and	normative	implica-tions	of	inclusion	in	…	the	same	category.	It	must	be	that	[we]	are	dealing	with	situa-tions	in	which	some	men	(less	often	women)	are	permitted	to	act,	in	some	degree,	as	
though	they	were	women	(or	men),	or	as	an	anomalous	‘he-she’	or	‘she-he.’	…	[One]	cannot	…	produce	any	 linguistic	data	to	demonstrate	that	 [members	of	 the	alleged	“third	 sex”]	 are	 treated	 in	 any	 language	 as	 a	 genuine	 third	 gender	 (Schef*ler	1991:377-78,	emphases	in	original).		This	needs	unpacking.	The	contention	that	gender	class	can	be	independent	of	geni-tal	anatomy	or	any	other	 “biological	basis”	dovetails	with	currently	 faddish	claims,	 in	 the	academy	and	outside	it.	Schef*ler’s	counter-claim	is	that	gender,	like	kinship,	has	as	its	se-mantically	central	form,	certain	traits	that	might	be	dubbed	“biological,”	or,	better,	“folk	bio-logical;”	i.e.	native	appreciations	of	biological	difference.	The	further	counter-claim	–	that	a	stipulation	of	the	folk-biological	criteria	for	membership	in	a	gender	class	is	logically	prior	to	the	behavioral	criteria	pertinent	to	that	class	–	is	a	transform,	in	the	sphere	of	gender,	of	Schef*ler’s	 charge	 against	 the	 “alternate	 distinctive	 features”	 argument	 put	 forward	 by	David	Schneider	(see	above).	Finally,	though	this	counter-claim	is	not	developed,	the	posit-ing	of	‘he-she’	and	‘she-he’	gender	subclasses	indicates	nonfocal	status,	these	categories	be-ing	logically	dependent	on	‘he’	and	‘she’	(i.e.	‘male’	and	‘female’)	classes.	These	points	are	pertinent	to	the	Navajo	case,	and	entirely	contrary	to	the	argument	put	 forward	 by	Wesley	 Thomas	 (1997),	 a	 native	Navajo	 speaker. 	 Here	we	 are	 told	 that	10‘woman’	constitutes	“[t]he	primary	gender	in	Navajo	culture”	(Thomas	1997:158):	this	re-calls	Witherspoon’s	assertion	(see	above),	and,	like	it,	it	presents	no	corroborating	semantic	evidence.	But	the	key	concern	of	Thomas’	essay	is	with	a	Navajo	gender	category	which,	fol-lowing	Hill	(1935),	I	shall	gloss	as	 ‘hermaphrodite,’	a	 label	which,	as	we	shall	see,	 is	quite	accurate.	 Thus	 Thomas	 (1997:157)	 tells	 us	 that	 ‘[t]he	 traditional	 gender	 system”	 of	 the	Navajo	is	“based	initially	on	biological	sex.”	“Initially	“here,	it	would	seem,	is	meant,	howev-er	unwittingly,	to	indicate	focal	status	from	which	‘hermaphrodites’	“subsequently”	depart;	i.e.,	temporal	imagery	is	here	used	to	express	differential	semantic	status.	Thomas	further	notes	 (ibid.)	 that	 there	 are	 “sex-linked	 …	 roles.”	 These	 involve	 the	 considerations	 that	“women	are	generally	weavers,	men	are	generally	hunters.”	Moreover:	Women’s	 sex-linked	 activities	 include	 those	 associated	 with	 childrearing,	 cooking	and	serving	meals,	making	pottery	and	baskets,	and	doing	…	other	work	associated	with	…	the	domestic	sphere.	For	men,	getting	wood,	preparing	cooking	*ires,	build-ing	homes,	hunting	,	…	and	doing	or	overseeing	work	associated	with	the	ceremonial	
	After	the	title	of	Thomas’s	essay,	identi*ication	as	Navajo	appears.	This	is	also	the	case	in	his	identi*ication	10in	the	co-authored	introduction	to	the	volume	(Jacobs	et	al....	1997).	I	*ind	this	odd.	In	the	latter	case,	his	co-authors	are	not	 identi*ied	ethnically,	nor	is	 it	common	to	do	so	in	scholarly	publications.	This	may	seem	in-nocuous,	but	as	soon	as	I	began	to	read	the	singly-authored	piece	I	predicted	I	would	be	in	store	for	an	unwel-come	lesson	in	identity	politics	and	not	–	not	primarily,	anyway	–	a	scholarly	essay.	I	was	all	too	correct.
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aspects	of	everyday	life	are	appropriate.	A[‘hermaphrodite’]	mixes	various	aspects	of	
the	behaviors…	of	both	 females	and	males	(Thomas	1997:158,	emphasis	added;	see	also	Aberle	1961:141-42;	Bailey	1950:74,	84;	Kluckhohn	and	Leighton	1974:94-95;	Lamphere	 1977:73,	 83,	 122,	 147;	 Shepardson	 1995:165-66;	 Spencer	 1947:24-25,	28,	99)).	In	 fact,	 this	 unremarkable	 division	 of	 labor	 is	 by	 no	means	 hard-and-fast:	 there	 is	abundant	 evidence,	 for	 example,	 that	 women	 can	 be	 active	 in	 Navajo	 ritual	 life,	 though	some	regard	this	as	deviant	(see	esp.	Schwarz	2007).	But	the	italicized	portion	of	the	quote	is	key,	for	it	makes	it	plain	that	the	‘hermaphrodite’	category	is	conceptualized	as	a	blend	of	male	and	female	qualities.	It	is	not,	as	Thomas	(1997:160)	contends,	a	“third	gender”	on	a	logical	par	with	the	focal	pair.	It	is,	in	Schef*ler’s	parlance,	a	“he-she”	or	a	“she-he.”	This	con-clusion	is	reinforced	by	Thomas’	translation	of	‘hermaphrodite’	as	someone	in	“a	constant	state	 of	 change”	 (1997:171),	 implying	 as	 it	 does	 non-membership	 in	 any	 *ixed	 category.	Even	more	telling,	*inally,	is	Katherine	Spencer’s	report	that	in	Navajo	mythology	the	‘her-maphrodite’	 is	 someone	 “who	will	 know	women’s	work	 and	 live	 like	 a	woman,	who	will	know	the	ways	of	both	men	and	women”	(Spencer	1947:98).	In	another	essay	on	Navajo	gender	classi*ication,	one	which	appears	in	the	same	vol-ume	as	Thomas’	contribution,	Carolyn	Epple	(1997:185)	provides	much	the	same	transla-tion,	though	she	is	far	more	explicit	on	the	liminal	position	of	‘hermaphrodites.’	She	inter-viewed	several	such	individuals,	three	of	whom	I	quote:	I	am	different	from	a	straight	male	…	and	from	a	homosexual	male…	I’d	rather	have	a	woman	[as	a	sexual	partner]	than	a	queen.	I	mean	I	do	have	some	kind	of	maleness.	[T]here’s	an	in-between	type	of	person	…	I	don’t	want	to	be	a	drag	queen,	and	I	don’t	want	to	be	a	girl.	A	queen	is	identi*ied	with	a	female.	But	I	don’t	consider	myself	a	girl.	I’m	a	man	and	am	attracted	to	men	(Epple	1997:181).	The	*irst	two	informants	occupy	a	nonfocal	gender	category.	One	claims	“some	kind	of	maleness,”	 the	 other	 identi*ies	 as	 an	 “in-between	 type	of	 person.”	The	 third	 informant	unambiguously	self-identi*ies	as	male.	One,	as	 if	 to	underscore	 the	point,	 remarks	 “There	are	 two	 [gender	 classes]	 –	 male	 and	 female	 –	 no	 others”	 (Epple	 1997:184).	 Epple	(1997:188)	concludes:	 “My	…	work	with	 [‘hermaphrodites’],	which	 includes	 the	question,	Are	 [‘hermaphrodites’]	a	 third	gender?	 indicates	 that,	 in	 the	explanations	of	my	 teachers,	they	are	not	an	alternate	gender	status.”	This	conclusion	 is	supported	by	some	other	 *indings.	Thus,	Navajo	seem	to	posit	a	pervasive	bipartite	plan	of	 the	sort	brought	 to	 the	attention	of	anthropologists	by	Robert	Hertz	(1960)	and,	later,	Rodney	Needham	(e.g.	1973), 	and	in	the	realm	of	gender	classi*i11 -cation	this	is	exempli*ied	by	the	categories	“male”	and	“female.”	Hermaphrodites	as	such	do	not	*igure	at	all.	Moreover,	in	kin	classi*ication	gender	in	its	male	and	female	forms	is	some-times	an	important	component,	but	I	have	been	able	to	uncover	only	a	single	reference	to	how	‘hermaphrodites’	*igure	in	such	reckoning:	thus	Katherine	Spencer	(1947:99)	notes	a	myth	in	which	“double	kinship	terms”	–	‘my	grandfather’	comingled	with	‘my	grandmother’	
	The	pertinent	literature	here	is	especially	extensive,	so	I	hesitate	to	cite	it	at	all.	The	single	best	source	is	11Schwarz	1997.	See	also	the	tabulation	in	Reichard	1950:596-97.
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–	are	applied,	thus	indicative	of	derived	gender	status	(see	also	Shepardson	1995:166).	Fi-nally,	Navajo	mythology	posits	a	primeval	separation	of	females	from	males,	with	the	latter	taking	 ‘hermaphrodites’	 –	described	 in	 these	narratives	 as	 “neither	 entirely	male	nor	 en-tirely	female”	–	acting	as	women	(Schwarz	2007:	17,	20-21;	Spencer	1947:25-26).	It	is	well	worth	noting	that	the	‘hermaphrodite’	category	is,	itself,	subdivided.	Epple	(1997:183)	suggests	this	when	she	writes	that	“a	hermaphrodite,	that	from	which	the	non-hermaphroditic	[‘hermaphrodites’]	are	generalized,	is	…	understood	in	terms	of	femaleness	and	maleness	and	not	necessarily	as	a	third	sex.”	 In	other	words,	 the	semantically	central	member	of	the	‘hermaphrodite’	class	is	an	individual	with	mixed	genitalia;	such	an	individ-ual	provides	a	conceptual	basis	for	extension	to	other	members	of	this	class.	And	this	is	just	what	W.W.	Hill	(1935)	found	over	eight	decades	ago.	More	speci*ically,	he	noted	that	Navajo	distinguish	between	‘real’	“hermaphrodites”	–	i.e.	individuals	with	genitals	of	both	sexes	–	and	‘those	who	pretend	to	be	“hermaphrodites”’	–	individuals	with	unambiguous	genitalia	(Hill	1935:273).	It	should	immediately	be	noted	that	this	 is	virtually	 identical	structurally	to	 the	 Choiseulese	 distinction	 between	 a	 ‘true’	 ‘father’	 and	 a	 ‘classi*icatory’	 one	 –	 a	 di-chotomy	which,	as	we	have	seen,	has	numerous	ethnographic	parallels.	But	even	more	per-tinent	here	is	that,	in	Navajo	conceptualization,	semantic	centrality	in	gender	classi*ication	is	dependent	on	genital	anatomy,	contrary	to	Wesley	Thomas	and	other	marketers	of	intel-lectual	faddishness,	but	much	as	Schef*ler	would	have	predicted. 	12To	the	extent	that	we	can	generalize	from	the	Navajo	case,	it	seems	clear	that	people	categorize	gender	primarily	on	the	basis	of	observable	biological	characteristics.	More	cer-tain	is	that	a	comparable	calculation	is	at	work	in	the	kinship	sphere	among	the	Navajo	and	virtually	 everywhere	 else:	 kinship	 has	 primarily	 to	 do	with	 the	 procreation-derived	 rela-tionships	within	the	nuclear	family.	From	these	bases	there	is	extension	in	both	domains	to	other	people,	to	mythical	beings	–	 ‘hermaphrodites’	*igure	in	Navajo	cosmology	–	 ,	and,	in	the	kinship	domain,	 to	 artifacts	 and	environmental	 features.	Schef*ler,	 I	 am	quite	 certain,	would	have	reached	much	the	same	conclusion.		
7.0	Concluding	remarks	The	foregoing	analysis,	I	submit,	is	closer	to	Navajo	understandings	than	Witherspoon’s	is,	largely	because,	as	 I	have	noted,	Witherspoon	 is	 less	dependent	on	 these	understandings	than	he	 is	on	what	 I	have	 termed	 “the	Schneider	Narrative.”	This	Narrative	has	 in	 subse-quent	kinship	studies	been	connected	with	an	embrace	of	“postmodern”/”deconstruction-ist”	argument	(Feinberg	2001:11).and	inadequate	attention	to	previous	scholarship,	which,	as	we	learn	from	Janet	Carsten’s	overview	of	these	studies,	are	just	old	hat	(Carsten	2004).	Yet,	trendiness	aside,	it	should	be	clear	from	my	prolegominal	remarks	that	the	Schneider	Narrative	is	plainly	and	simply	false:	far	from	being	entrapped	in	Eurocentric	assumptions,	Schef*ler	and	ethnographers	before	him	relied	on	discerning	analyses	of	the	pertinent	lan-guages,	attending	especially	to	the	phenomena	of	lexical	marking	(see	esp.	Schef*ler	1985,	1987).	I	am	quite	certain	that	Schneider	was	familiar	with	at	least	some	of	these	analyses,	and	equally	certain	that	he	lacked	the	analytical	skills	to	grasp	their	import.	This	criticism	may	seem	unwarranted	in	view	of	the	enormous	prestige	he	enjoys	in	current	kinship	stud-ies.	But	to	see	it	all	one	has	to	do	is	to	consider	his	argument	in	American	Kinship	that	his	
	In	an	endnote	to	his	essay,	Thomas	(1997:171)	seems	to	support	Hill’s	analysis.	For	an	outstanding	critique	12of	scholarly	faddishness	in	“third	gender”	studies,	see	Besnier	(1994).
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employment	 of	 the	 expression	 “distinctive	 features”	 is	 “taken	 directly	 from	linguistics”	 (Schneider	1968:	32).	This	 is	preposterous,	 for	 two	reasons.	First,	 the	alleged	“distinctive	feature”	of	“enduring,	diffuse	solidarity”	has	no	clear	empirical	referent,	some-thing	already	noted;	rather,	 it	stems	from	Schneider’s	undisciplined	intuition.	Second,	and	related,	the	expression	“distinctive	features”	as	employed	by	linguists	refers	to	empirically	discernible	 sound	properties,	 and	 these	properties	 are	 independent	 of	any	particular	 lan-guage.	The	elucidation	of	these	properties	in	linguistic	theory	is	a	result	of	careful	analyses	of	particular	 languages	already	studied,	which	analyses	have	generated	an	etic	grid	 to	be	used	in	the	future	study	of	particular	languages:	Ward	Goodenough	(1970,	1981)	was	espe-cially	important	in	applying	all	this	to	a	theory	of	ethnographic	description.	The	result	is	a	discipline	based	on	cumulative	and	replicable	knowledge,	not	the	analytical	sloppiness	and	unchecked	guesses	of	a	messianic	leader.		Whatever	 the	 faults	 of	 their	 analyses,	 most	 of	 Schneider’s	 early	 admirers	 knew	enough	linguistics	to	come	up	with	valuable	studies	of	kinship	constructs	in	the	communi-ties	in	which	they	worked	(e.g.	Inden	and	Nicholas	1977;	Leaf	1972;	Silverman	1971).	For	the	most	part	 it	 is	only	with	 the	scholarship	of	 the	 last	 four	decades	 that	kinship	studies	have	taken	a	decided	downturn,	with	primitivist,	Marxist	and	especially	so-called	“radical”	feminist	 fantasies	 trumping	 reasoned	 analysis.	 What	 makes	 Witherspoon	 remarkable	 is	that,	almost	alone	among	David	Schneider’s	*irst	cohort	of	graduate	students,	his	rendition	of	his	*ield	materials,	lacking	as	it	does	anything	resembling	expertise	in	linguistic	methods,	is	an	unintended	harbinger	of	the	present	retrograde	state	of	the	sub-discipline.	Nowadays,	“expertise”	in	kinship	studies	is	bestowed	on	the	basis	of	participation	in	a	New	Establish-ment,	 one	which	presents	 itself	 as	 “cutting-edge”	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	 has,	 supposedly,	“deconstructed”	more	intellectually	demanding	and	more	responsible	analytic	methods.	The	shoe	really	should	be	on	the	other	foot:	the	“deconstructionists”	in	kinship	stud-ies	 themselves	 warrant	 deconstruction.	 Like	 most	 Establishments,	 they	 refuse	 reasoned	debate:	when	they	address	scholarly	opponents	at	all,	it	is	with	ad	hominem	charges	of	eth-nocentrism,	 “biological	 reductionism,”	 or	 subscription	 to	 unfashionable	 political	 agendas	(e.g.	Franklin	2001;	Sahlins	2012;	Schneider	1989).	Schef*ler,	by	contrast,	was	keen	to	re-spond	to	critics:	his	Baniata	essay,	already	considered,	is	key	here,	but	it	is	supplemented	by	a	very	considerable	corpus	of	intellectual	engagement	(see	references).	Instead	of	an	empirically	unsustainable	relativism,	the	work	of	the	man	honored	in	this	article	supports	the	contention	of	the	Psychic	Unity	of	Humankind	on	which	our	disci-pline	was	founded.	Early	in	his	career,	Hal	Schef*ler	maintained	that	although	 the	 nuclear	 family	…	may	 not	 be	 present	 in	 every	 human	 society	 –	 it	 is	present	…	in	better	than	ninety-nine	per	cent	–	recent	advances	in	our	understand-ing	of	[our]	nature	as	a	primate	have	established	that	the	nuclear	family	has	its	roots	in	that	nature.	The	pervasive	recurrence	and	durability	of	the	nuclear	family	…	is	the	product	of	several	factors:	the	extreme	and	prolonged	dependency	of	human	infants	and	children	upon	both	male	and	 female	adults;	 the	division	of	 labor	between	 the	adult	 sexes	which	 arises	 out	 of	 behavioral	 differences	 related	 to	 the	 sexual	 differ-ences;	and	the	enduring	unions	that	tend	to	form	between	adults	of	the	opposite	sex	in	order	to	rear	children,	to	subsist,	and	because	of	the	continual	sexual	receptivity	of	the	human	female	(Schef*ler	1966:12).	
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More	than	a	half	century	later,	with	massive	increases	in	what	have	been	called	“al-ternate	 family	 forms,”	 these	remarks	may	seem	dated.	But	 if	 they	do,	we	ought	 to	ponder	why,	for	example,	in	some	of	the	Nayar	groups	studied	by	Kathleen	Gough	a	decade	earlier,	and	in	spite	of	the	absence	of	a	localized	nuclear	family,	not	only	is	individual	paternity	rec-ognized	 but,	 as	well,	 genitors	 have	 special	 and	 locally	 recognized	 relationship	with	 their	children	(Gough	1961);	why,	in	the	best-studied	case	of	polyandry,	individual	genitorship	is	comparably	respected	 (Levine	1988:167-68);	and	why,	 in	at	 least	 some	African-American	ghettos,	women	evidence	a	decided	preference	for	men	who	are	prepared	to	stay	with	them	(Stack	1975).	Equally	 important,	 Schef*ler	 was	 much	 concerned	 with	 replicability,	 with	 the	 re-sponsibility	of	a	scholar	to	other	intellectuals	and	to	a	wider	public.	In	the	selfsame	essay	he	insisted	that	“a	naïve	imaginative	apprehension	of	other	people’s	models	will	not	do	as	an	anthropological	method;	our	apprehension	of	other	people’s	models	must	be	established	by	means	of	some	systematic,	replicable	method”	(Schef*ler	1966:68).	In	today’s	anthropo-logical	climate	this	too	may	seem	outdated,	which	invites	us	to	ponder	the	political	implica-tions	of	relying	instead	on	arbitrarily	selected	bits	of	evidence,	undisciplined	intuition,	and	–	worst	 of	 all	 in	 a	 free	 society	 –	 an	 unwillingness	 to	 engage	 in	 genuine	 debate	 (see	 esp.	Shapiro	2018a).	In	case	we	need	reminding,	given	today’s	Executive	leadership	in	Washing-ton,	our	political	system	is	founded	upon	more	universalistic	principles.	
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